Maturing US attitudes towards China's rise - 10 August 2006

Just over a year ago, in July 2005, we issued a Special Bulletin on US-China relations. Reviewing testimony to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, we concluded that the overriding impression was of US fear of China. The testimony given last week to the same commission on "China’s role in the world" gives a very different impression of US-China relations and reveals a significant maturing of US attitudes.

At the July 2005 hearings, we were particularly struck by the testimony of Dr Marvin C Ott, Professor of National Security Policy at the National War College, who argued with regard to China in Southeast Asia that Chinese foreign policy was being driven by geopolitical ambition and nationalism and that it was intent on establishing a "pre-eminent sphere of influence" in the region. He said: "There is a strategic contest (a Great Game) underway and one player has developed a sophisticated strategy and has already collected a number of chips; the other player does not have a strategy and acts like it is unaware the game has started. So far the US is losing the game."

Last week’s testimony on China’s policy in Southeast Asia, given by Karl D Jackson of the School of Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins University, was far less alarmist. His view is that Southeast Asia is accommodating the rise of China with little problem and that "rather than being drawn totally into China’s economic and security orbit, Southeast Asian nations continue to maintain balanced economic relationships with non-Chinese markets while continuing to play a sophisticated diplomatic game that hedges the rise of China with the continued presence of the United States, the on-going importance of Japan, and the rise of India."

Jackson admits that China is now treating Southeast Asia "seriously" and that the US faces a much more skilled and competitive Chinese diplomatic corps than in the past, but this just means that "a healthy US policy should adjust itself to increased competition". In Jackson’s view, the desire of Southeast Asian nations to maintain their independence will ensure that they will continue to hedge between the main centres of power. The idea of Southeast Asia inexorably becoming part of a new Chinese hegemony is dismissed.

Robert Sutter, of the School of Foreign Service Georgetown University, adopted the same line of argument, pointing to the degree to which the many independent-minded countries of Asia hedge in reaction to China’s rise. He said: "These governments work quietly among themselves and with the United States to ensure that their independence and freedom of action will not be negatively affected as China rises in prominence in the region. Such actions reinforce US leadership in Asia as China rises."

On Northeast Asia, Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt took at equally relaxed view, saying that China’s relations with its neighbours are dictated by "its grand strategic objective of preserving peace and stability in its ‘near abroad’ so that economic development can proceed". He argued that China is acting in "a discrete and benign way" in its pursuit of this objective, and he said "it is a fact that Chinese power (economic and military) and the lure of the China market has underwritten a decade and a half of very adroit diplomacy aimed at eliminating points of tension and disputes with its contiguous neighbours".

Even on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which many see as a major challenge to the US, McDevitt was relaxed, saying: "The SCO is a multilateral manifestation of Beijing’s single-minded strategy aimed at ensuring good relations with its neighbours." And he ruled out any future confrontation between Russia and China over natural resources or China’s need for lebensraum on the grounds that it would be "counter to Beijing’s desire for a peaceful neighbourhood" and because "changing international norms and Russia’s massive nuclear arsenal make it very unlikely that a weakened Russia will suffer the same fate as China in the 19th century".

On North Korea, McDevitt was also understanding, arguing that China is sincere in its desire to end Pyongyang’s nuclear programme, but "it is not concerned enough to apply serious economic pressure that could cause the Kim regime to collapse…Its goal is to maintain a reasonably stable situation."

Closer to home, the two testimonies on Chinese influence on Latin America continued this far more relaxed approach to China’s rise. Last year the commission heard Al Sanatoli of the Asia-America Initiative argue that "Chinese geo-strategic practices of asymmetrical warfare…have been steadily and effectively growing during the past decade in Latin America." He added: "Chinese tactics are being used to gain political and economic influence, as well as military alliances and bases for cyber-electronic warfare. These developments are a critical challenge to the United States in a vulnerable resource-rich area on our doorstep that we have too often taken for granted."

Last week, Cynthia Watson of the National War College put an entirely different viewpoint, saying: "I do not believe China currently poses a significant threat to the United States in Latin America." She argued that China’s relationship with the US was too important to Beijing to risk by upsetting Washington in Latin America, and she said that - in any case - the Chinese were well within their rights to view Latin America as coming within their global interests and that it was "acting as any great power would act".

Not even China’s relations with Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez seem to cause serious concern any longer. William Ratliff of the Hoover Institution first of all dismissed Chavez as an example of "that cyclical Latin American phenomenon of the macho anti-American caudillo who is far more remarkable for his crude punchy personality and popularity (with some) than for his progressive politics". He then argued that China’s interest in Venezuela is economic rather than political and that it is "more put off than enthusiastic about Chavez political campaigns which could result in turmoil in the region or conflict with the United States". He also pointed out that Hugo Chavez’s attitude towards the United States preceded any relationship with China "and is in no way a result of that relationship".

Underlining this apparent shift in perceptions from seeing the rise of China as an inevitable threat towards seeing it as something natural that needs dealing with in a grown up way, Dr Ernest J Wilson III, from the University of Maryland, made the point that China is behaving no differently to any other nation in using all the tools of statecraft to advance its multiple interests, including its interest in obtaining natural resources and energy. As he pointed out: "All governments tend to pay more attention to resource-rich countries than to resource-poor ones."

The view of the US administration towards China was put by Thomas J Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and this also showed a shift in attitude over recent months. He said that he believed the prospects were "good" for China playing "a more positive role in the global system", and he said that there was evidence that the more China becomes a major part of the global system, "the more its interests align with those of other major stakeholders, including the US".

On North Korea, Christensen had particular praise for China, saying: "In the past few weeks we have seen China take unprecedented actions to express concerns to North Korea over its provocative missile launches." And he praised China’s support for UNSC Resolution 1696 requiring Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment programme. He also had some mildly positive things to say about China’s contributions on Iraq and Afghanistan and even on Myanmar and Sudan.

However, criticism of China’s energy policy was implicit in Christensen’s comment that: "We are encouraging China to realize that the best way for it to pursue its energy security is to help strengthen global markets not to seek preferential equity deals with irresponsible and, ultimately, unstable regimes."

He was critical of China’s performance on human rights, trade, and non-proliferation. And he again reiterated US concerns about China’s military modernization - although he accepted that military modernization was in part "a natural consequence of China’s growing economic means and the comparatively outdated nature of its armed forces".

He also opened his remarks with a false dichotomy which spelled out perfectly a difficulty that is likely to continue to plague US-China relations. He asked: "Will China use its rising influence in ways that are compatible with US interests, or will it seek to advance interests that undermine the global system and the peace and prosperity it has provided for so many around the world?"

Clearly China, and many others (including many European powers), would argue that it is possible to pursue policies that are not necessarily "compatible with" US interests but which do not automatically undermine global peace and prosperity. Differing views on how best to resolve the current crisis in Lebanon would be an obvious example - as, indeed, would be the wider question of the war on terrorism.

For China, this is more than a quibble, because as Christensen said: "We need to maintain strong US regional capabilities in case China does not eventually move down a path consistent with our interests."

Christensen also emphasized the importance - to the US - of China moving towards a liberal democracy. He said: "We…urge China to move more quickly toward strengthening respect for human rights and religious freedom, as well as introduce democracy to its system."

For China, there are two problems with Christensen’s analysis. The first is that the US administration defines its concept of being a responsible global stakeholder as being synonymous with acting in accordance with US interests. The second is that the US wants to go further than this. Turning China into a responsible global stakeholder (as defined by the US) is not the only objective. Transforming China’s political system is a parallel objective.

Nevertheless, Christensen’s remarks were broadly positive, particularly given previous administration criticisms of China’s military build-up and its policies towards North Korea.

The one testimony that was unequivocally critical of China concerned its policy towards Sudan. Eric Reeves argued: "There is in Africa no more destructive bilateral relationship than that between China and Sudan…Beijing’s relentless military, commercial, and diplomatic support of the National Islamic Front regime has done much to ensure that Sudan remains controlled by a vicious cabal of genocidaires."

This was powerful - and undoubtedly accurate - testimony. But it didn’t do much to undermine the thrust of the other testimony: namely that China’s rise is normal and need not be overly threatening provided the US is careful and diligent in its diplomatic reactions.

There were, however, two extremely important caveats to this general rule. The first - a point we have made many times - concerns Taiwan. It remains all too easy to see how this issue, which is of visceral importance to Beijing and is hardly less important to Washington, could escalate towards conflict. And it was noteworthy that Christensen ended his remarks with some warning comments on Taiwan. He said: "We…note the rapidly growing capabilities arrayed against Taiwan that risk disrupting the status quo. We respond to those increases in accordance with our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act."

The second is Japan. In his generally measured testimony, Admiral McDevitt looked in some depth at Sino-Japanese relations, and he made the very important point that there is a unique historic circumstance in Northeast Asia today. It is the first time in history that a powerful Japan and a powerful China are facing one another, and this unique circumstance is compounded by fundamental sources of friction, including competition for regional leadership, growing nationalism in both societies, territorial disputes, Taiwan, military modernization in both countries, perceptions of threat in both capitals, and the growing competition over potential energy resources in areas close to both countries, especially in the East China Sea and Siberia.

This is serious enough in its own right, but it also causes problems for the US because it has no option but to lean towards Tokyo - a fact which, McDevitt points out, "contributes to [Beijing’s] views that Washington is ‘complicit’ in Japan’s more assertive policies". We agree both caveats. The direction of US-China relations is more likely to be dictated by how Tokyo-Beijing relations evolve and by policy decisions in Taipei than by real or perceived Chinese incursions into traditional US spheres of influence. JdeC.