Iran should have sufficient cards to deter US attack - SIR 23 August 2007

Some sources are increasingly convinced that Washington is preparing airstrikes against selected targets in the Islamic Republic, particularly after the decision was made to list Tehran’s elite Sepah-e Pasdaran (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or IRCG) as a ‘terrorist organisation’. Our own assessment is that this would be a grave error as there remain good reasons to believe that the consequences of such a policy would be to put Coalition forces in Iraq in even greater jeopardy, while also bolstering the position of the Iranian ultra-hardliners led by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and risking a potentially disastrous impact on global oil prices.

The following are our reasons for this assessment:

- Ahmadinejad is currently facing rising criticism and discontent at home, but a US (or Israeli) attack is likely to result in a majority of Iranians rallying round the country’s leadership, thus strengthening the ultra-hardliners

- Pragmatists, presently gathered around former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, will be forced to throw their weight behind Ahmadinejad

- Following a military strike against Iranian targets, what remains of the Iranian movement for moderate reform is likely to be silenced and Iranians with real or perceived links to the West will be placed at serious risk

- Many Iraqi Shia would see an attack on Iran as an attack against their co-religionists, boosting support for militant factions within Iraq and increasing the level of threat to Coalition forces

- Iran may retaliate by providing Shia militants in Iraq with far more sophisticated weaponry than is presently available

- Tehran could activate ‘sleeper’ cells across the world to target US interests worldwide, thus opening a new front in global terrorism

- There would be a risk of a major impact on the global oil market, particularly if Iran halted or restricted exports or blocked access to and from the Gulf

As we have pointed out in our recent analysis, Ahmadinejad’s position is far from secure (see SIR 9 August). Domestic unrest and rising discontent over economic mismanagement are presenting a significant challenge to his regime. Moreover, he is in danger of losing ground to pragmatic conservatives such as his key rival Rafsanjani.

Amid the current controversy over fuel rationing, Iran’s gathering internal crisis was highlighted earlier this week by the country’s recently sacked oil minister, Kazem Vaziri-Hamaneh, who warned that "I am ready to prove that if the fuel situation continues along current trends we will face an energy crisis in the future…The current pattern of consumption is a disaster for the country."

It is clear to see that Ahmadinejad’s domestic policies are in deep trouble. However, that could all easily change if Iran comes under military attack from the US or, much less likely, from Israel. Confronted by a belligerent external enemy, Iranians can be expected to rally round an administration that will not hesitate to play the nationalist card. Moderates who favour dialogue and improved relations with the West will be silenced amid the inevitable patriotic frenzy.

Although there are some voices within the White House who appear to believe that the Islamic Republic will totter and fall if elite units such as the IRGC come under attack, few experienced regional analysts share this view. Pointing to the popular Iranian reaction to the Iraqi attack in September 1980 which triggered the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, they warn that a US air campaign would not dislodge Ahmadinejad.

And unlike Iraq before the ill-fated US-led invasion in 2003, Tehran does have a substantial arsenal which includes biological, chemical, and, in all likelihood, some form of radiological weapons. The IRCG may appear to some Washington hawks as a tempting target in terms of payback for alleged interference in the Iraqi insurgency, but the Islamic Republic has teeth and can be expected to bite back. At the lowest level, this might involve providing more sophisticated weaponry to Shia militants operating on the ground in Iraq.

One of the key charges laid against the IRCG by the US administration is the alleged supply of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) – including some which have the capacity to strike tanks – to Iraqi insurgents. Last week, a US commander in Iraq, Maj-Gen Rick Lynch, claimed in media interviews that a unit of 50 IRCG personnel are active inside the country providing training for Shia militia members. However, when pressed, Lynch conceded that no Iranians had yet been captured in the region for which he has responsibility. He also acknowledged that some Iranian weapons may be entering Iraq via the blackmarket.

Hard evidence of direct Iranian involvement appears hard to come by. And even if Tehran is supplying low-level weaponry there can be no doubt that Ahmadinejad’s regime – which is dominated by former IRCG personnel – could opt to provide a far greater range of military hardware, including much more sophisticated surface-to-air missiles, should it choose to do so.

Moreover, the IRCG is a multi-faceted force – believed to have a strength of around 125,000 – of whom an estimated 5,000 are trained to be deployed on ‘unconventional’ missions at home and abroad, including the Al-Quds Brigade which supports Hamas and Hezbollah. In theory, these elite, ideologically committed forces could be unleashed across the region and beyond with a brief to strike against the interests of the US and its allies. There are also believed to be a number of Iranian ‘sleeper cells’ located around the world which could be activated with similar objectives. Against this background, it can be seen that military action against Iran would not be a low-risk strategy

There are also wider geopolitical issues, and it is far from certain that Washington would be able to carry any of its key regional allies should it opt to launch an air campaign against Iran. As US analyst Anthony H Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies observed in a recent article in The New York Times: "Washington cannot — and should not — try to bring security to the Gulf without allies, and Saudi Arabia is the only meaningful military power there that can help deter and contain a steadily more aggressive Iran."

Whatever Riyahd’s concerns over the growth of Iranian regional influence and the threat posed by the so-called ‘Shia Crescent’ there appears to be little or no appetite in the Kingdom for any expansion of US military activity across the Gulf. Indeed, as we have pointed out to subscribers, one of the key concerns across the Islamic world is escalating tensions between Sunni Muslims and Shias. Any hint of approval or collusion in a US strike against Iranian targets from the Saudis would inevitably fuel those flames of sectarian division (see SIR 2 August).

And then there is the wider economic impact of an attack to consider. According to figures provided by the Iran National Oil Company (NIOC) the country produces between 3.5m and 4m barrels of crude oil per day. Disrupting this supply could be expected to lead to rocketing international prices with a knock-on economic impact across the industrialised world.

Tehran also has the strategic muscle to close, or at least severely restrict shipping in the Gulf as the so-called "Tanker War" during the Iran-Iraq War demonstrated. It is estimated that around 546 vessels were damaged in these waters during the conflict in the 1980s, and there is no evidence to suggest that the Iranian leadership is not capable of taking similar action again. Since around 40% of the world’s crude oil shipments pass through the Straits of Hormuz, this is not a threat to be taken lightly.

Iran is well aware of its strategic advantage. Back in March 2005, Iranian Expediency Council secretary Mohsen Rezai – himself a former IRCG commander – warned that "An attack on Iran will be tantamount to endangering Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and – in a word – the entire Middle East oil."

Another stark warning was given last week when Major-Gen Yahya Rahim Safavi, commander-in-chief of the IRGC, asserted that "Our coast-to-sea missile systems can now reach the length and breadth of the Gulf and the Sea of Oman and no warships can pass in the Gulf without being in range of our coast-to-sea missiles." Even if US strikes succeed in degrading some of these offensive capabilities, Iran’s ability to cause havoc for international shipping will remain one of Tehran’s principal weapons against its enemies.

There is still room to hope that Washington’s increasingly hardline stance towards the IRCG is merely a tactic designed to increase pressure on Tehran, rather than a precursor to some form of direct military action. However, if not, the potential consequences could prove extremely far-reaching. Far from discouraging Iranian support for the Shia insurgency in Iraq, we fear that US strikes against targets in Iran would strengthen Ahmadinejad’s grip on power, destabilise the region further, and trigger an international oil crisis. SIR.