Abiding US suspicions of China - Stratint Review, 13 March 2008
The latest annual report to Congress by the US Secretary
of Defence on the “Military Power of the People’s
Republic of China” reinforces an impression of continuing US
suspicion about China’s rise. The following is an abridged
version of an assessment first published in SIR’s associated
Asia Intelligence Service (in the March issue of AsiaInt North Asia
Review).
The media coverage of the latest Pentagon report on
China’s military power has focused mainly on allegations of
Chinese cyber-spying, on the true level of Chinese military spending
along with its rate of increase (17.6% this year), and on the
development of weapons and jammers to prevent the use of space-based
systems at times of conflict or crisis. The report said that China is
“exploring satellite jammers, kinetic energy weapons,
high-power lasers, high-powered microwave weapons, particle beam
weapons, and electromagnetic pulse weapons for counter-space
application”.
These points are a good reflection of US concerns about China.
However the most interesting part of the Pentagon report is the section
on “understanding China’s strategy”, for
it is this section that reveals US views about China’s
long-term intentions rather than just its present capabilities and
activities.
The section begins with the well known quote from Deng
Xiaoping known as the “24 character strategy”.
Deng’s injunction was to “Observe calmly; secure
our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide
our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim
leadership.” This “24 character strategy”
is seen as suggesting a strategy “to maximize future
options”, and, according to the Pentagon report, President Hu
Jintao’s “Harmonious World” theory,
endorsed at the October 2007 17th Party Congress, “does not
overturn or supersede Deng’s ’24 character
strategy’”.
The Pentagon goes on to argue that the CCP has come to rely on
economic performance and nationalism “as a substitute for the
failure of communist ideology to unify the population and mobilize
political support”. The danger is that if economic growth
falters, an even higher reliance on nationalism will be necessary.
It also clearly believes that economic performance will indeed
falter because of underlying weaknesses such as non-performing loans,
inefficient state-owned enterprises, and economic disparity between
urban and rural areas. The report warns: “Economic shocks,
setbacks, or even modestly slower growth could lead to higher
unemployment, inflation, and significant unrest, potentially giving
rise to greater reliance on nationalism to maintain popular support for
the CCP.”
One interesting point the Pentagon report makes on a potential
economic crisis is the fact that China’s leaders have limited
experience in dealing with a correction or recession in a complex
market economy, and “it is not certain whether their
responses would ease or exacerbate temporary dislocations”.
In addition to the danger of a recourse to nationalism, the
Pentagon report points out that China has legitimate national interests
that are pushing it towards a greater military capability, particularly
in the area of energy security given that its oil consumption will rise
from 7.58m barrels of oil per day to 10m-12m bpd by 2015. At current
levels of consumption it is already importing 53% of its oil, with
slightly over half coming from the Middle East and a quarter from
Africa.
The Pentagon notes that currently China is not capable of
using military power either to secure its foreign energy investments or
of defending critical sea lanes against disruption, but it then argues
that China may seek to close this gap by “developing
extended-range power projection, including aircraft carrier
development; expeditionary warfare; undersea warfare; anti-air warfare;
long-range precision strike; maritime C4ISR; expeditionary logistics
and forward basing; training and exercises, especially in open water;
and a more activist military presence abroad.”